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Contemporary political theory is characterised by a realistic critique of lib-
eralism, in which the political realm is more clearly distinguished from the 
moral. In the literature, two lines of argument are invoked to support realist 
considerations in politics: first, political realism is seen as an antidote to a 
somehow idealized and unfeasible version of liberalism; and second, realist 
theorizing is said to provide the proper contingent response to the deep plu-
ralism that characterises contemporary democracies (Horton 2010, Galston 
2010). In the first case, political realism is strictly defined as an anti-utopian 
and feasible theory, while in the second, realist theorizing is seen as avoid-
ing foundational disagreements about justice mutating into second-order 
disputes concerning the justifiability of legitimate political institutions. In 
this second sense, the realist critique challenges a key aspect of Rawls’ liberal 
project – that is, its justificatory constituency.1
David McCabe (2010, 6) presents an interesting example of realist cri-
tique of Rawls’ justificatory project. McCabe argues that Rawls’ Political Lib-
eralism, which relies on a substantive consensus view, asks citizens to commit 
1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the panel on “Modus Vivendi and the 
Problem of Inequalities of Power”, Ipsa world congress 2016 (Poznan) and at the work-
shop on “Modus Vivendi Theory” at Mancept Workshops in Political Theory 2016 
(Manchester). For their stimulating comments I am grateful above all to Fabian Wendt, 
Fabian Wenner and Manon Westphal. Special thanks are owed to John Horton for his 
extensive comments and precious suggestions on the last version of this article. Finally, 
I am thankful to Elisabetta Galeotti for inviting me to take part of this editorial project 
and Federica Liveriero and Beatrice Magni for their editorial work for this special issue.
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to a demanding version of the justificatory requirement “that expresses polit-
ical values that others as free and equal also might reasonably be expected to 
endorse” (Rawls 1996, l). Yet this goal is practically unfeasible and norma-
tively inadequate if the aim of liberal theory is to take the fact of moral diver-
sity seriously. In conditions of deep pluralism, the justificatory requirement 
should be recast so to include those, illiberal or sceptical, who are in fact 
excluded by Rawls’ justificatory constituency. Following Scanlon, McCabe 
believes that the argument for liberalism should be one the critic of liberalism 
cannot reasonably reject (2010, 7). 
This paper contributes to this discussion by confronting the modus vivendi 
justificatory project as presented by McCabe with Rawls’ liberal project. It 
suggests that both Modus Vivendi Liberalism (hereafter MVL) and Political 
Liberalism (hereafter PL) seem to endorse a practice-dependent account of 
political justice in which “politics is prior to morality”; yet the ways in which 
reasons are endorsed to justify the shared conception of political authority are 
significantly different in these two schemes. McCabe presents a distinctive 
kind of contingent practice-dependent liberalism that might be distinguished 
from Rawls’ institutional model. Following Sangiovanni (2008), I recover the 
notion of ‘practice-dependence’ to reveal the differences underlying these 
two liberal projects and the implications that a contingent practice-dependent 
model might have on what McCabe calls the central feature of the liberal 
project, that is its Justificatory Requirement (JR) (McCabe 2010, 5).
The paper is structured as follows. Starting from Rawls’ notion of consen-
sus-based toleration, Section 1 provides a brief reconstruction of the recent 
literature on modus vivendi. A common feature in this body of work is to 
consider modus vivendi as a realist and strictly political response to Rawls’ 
highly moralised conception of political authority. Section 2 focuses on a 
specific version of modus vivendi political theorizing, as suggested by McCabe 
(2010). McCabe’s MVL is here presented as an alternative liberal justificatory 
project: it insists on a notion of political legitimacy that is crucially linked to 
the inclusion of a plurality of voices in the justificatory constituency of liberal 
democratic societies. Section 3 reconsiders both Rawls’ and McCabe’s ver-
sions of justificatory liberalism in the light of Sangiovanni’s notion of prac-
tice-dependence. It distinguishes two practice-dependent justificatory views: 
Rawls’ institutional model and McCabe’s contingent one. Section 4 focuses on 
the ideal of political legitimacy implicit in such a contingent model, which 
is guaranteed by what I call the ‘Inclusiveness Requirement’ (IR). Section 5 
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shows that this version of political legitimacy seems to rely on an idea of pub-
lic justification based on convergence of reasons. This is opposed to Rawls’ 
institutional model, which insists on the conditions of shareability and acces-
sibility of reasons as a basis for public justification. This section clarifies the 
differences between these two models and their implications for such issues 
as stability and autonomy. Lastly, Section 6 considers McCabe’s proposal as a 
case of practice-independent justificatory liberalism. In this second reading, 
however, MVL seems to be inconsistent with its realist premises. 
1. From Political liberalism to modus vivendi theorizing 
The tension between moral pluralism and the stability of liberal institutions is 
central to contemporary liberal thought. In PL, Rawls famously asks, “How is 
it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal 
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines?” (Rawls 1996, xxv) For Rawls, institutions and, especially, 
the constitution of a democratic society provide the proper framework of reasons 
for reaching an ‘overlapping consensus’ and thus supporting liberal democratic 
arrangements over time. In this way, he argues, a “stability for the right reasons” is 
realized (xxxix). This account importantly links the issue of the stability of liberal 
institutions in plural societies to the principle of liberal legitimacy so that the view 
of toleration introduces a conception of political authority which is justified to 
everyone in terms that cannot reasonably be rejected. 
Here, Rawls draws an important distinction between two different mod-
els of toleration: a view of liberal toleration based on an ‘overlapping consen-
sus’, and another, more traditional view that he calls ‘modus vivendi’ (Rawls 
1996, 181). A modus vivendi sees people in divided societies endorsing liberal 
institutions as a matter of balancing opposing forces. In such circumstances, 
citizens view society as a compromise between what they consider to be the 
best possible arrangement (namely, a state based solely on their own com-
prehensive doctrine) and the worst (namely, a state based solely on a com-
prehensive doctrine opposed to their own). Yet, within a modus vivendi, each 
citizen sees the liberal state as, at most, a second-best political order, and 
accordingly the relationship between state and citizen is inherently unstable. 
Rawls clarifies this point using the example of Catholicism and Protestantism 
in the sixteenth century: 
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Both faiths held that it was the duty of the ruler to uphold the true religion 
and to repress the spread of heresy and false doctrine. In such a case, the 
acceptance of the principle of toleration would indeed be a mere modus vi-
vendi, because if either faith becomes dominant, the principle of toleration 
would no longer be followed. Stability with respect to the distribution of 
power is lacking (Rawls 1996, 148).
Recently, the notion of modus vivendi has revived. It has increasingly at-
tracted the interest of scholars who criticize the implicit moralism and strict 
legalism of Rawls’ project. First, John Gray has proposed an idea of modus 
vivendi as an antidote to Rawls’ “anti-political legalism” (Gray 2000, 16). 
Gray distinguishes between two incompatible views of liberal toleration: one 
aimed at establishing universally justified principles that are based on rational 
consensus, the other instead focusing on the more modest claim of balancing 
different values and ways of life. He insists on the need to dismiss a liberal 
universalist project in favour of a view of liberal toleration that is compatible 
with the historical fact of pluralism (6). According to Gray, Rawls’ justifica-
tory framework, reflecting values that are firmly grounded on an ‘overlapping 
consensus’, is in fact unable to accommodate the demands of moral plural-
ism. This approach displaces all fundamental issues, such as basic liberties 
and social distribution, from the realm of politics (16). Yet, Gray reminds us, 
disagreement does not cover only the good, but also the right (7). A modus 
vivendi, which does not rely on problematic notions such as truth or right, 
should inform a feasible political project of liberal toleration. This is based 
on the idea of compromise and bargain among competing communities who 
hold different sets of values. Under a modus vivendi, toleration is presented 
as a condition for peace which embraces diversity instead of suppressing it. 
Gray’s defence of modus vivendi liberalism has inspired a vast body of 
literature focused on the possibilities of reconciling an account of toleration 
with what Waldron (1999) has called the ‘circumstances of politics’. Differ-
ent views regarding not only the concept of the good but also the content 
and the application of the principles of justice inevitably must confront the 
issue of political authority and the ways in which it should be constructed in 
order to be legitimate (Gentile 2017). Matters of justice therefore cannot be 
isolated from matters of politics, nor, more precisely, from those democratic 
procedures and practices that can be widely recognised as legitimate. In this 
literature, it is possible to broadly distinguish two distinct approaches: the 
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first insists on an account of comprehensive pluralism (Galston 2002), while 
the second seeks to recast the problem of political legitimacy in contexts of 
deep pluralism in less moralised terms (see for instance Horton 2010, 2012; 
McCabe 2010). To recall Williams (2005, 1-3), I shall call this approach 
‘political realism’. 
This paper focuses on the second version of modus vivendi theorizing. For 
political realism, a modus vivendi envisages a “broadly consensual” view of 
toleration that introduces a procedural interest of the parties in recognizing 
the legitimacy of a particular political arrangement (Horton 2010, 432). In 
contrast to Rawls’ principle of liberal legitimacy and its justificatory struc-
ture, this view invokes a narrower idea of legitimacy understood as a dis-
tinctive political concept (Galston 2010, 388). Thus, appropriate standards 
of evaluation of the legitimate institutional arrangement should arise within 
politics rather than from external moral standards (Galston 2010, 386). 
2. modus vivendi, political legitimacy and public justification
Within what I have labelled ‘political realism’ it is possible to distinguish 
at least two different ways in which political legitimacy has been linked to 
the notion of modus vivendi. For Horton (2012), the problem with Rawls’ 
principle of liberal legitimacy is that it depends on an account of justice 
that is implicit in its justificatory structure. Against this, Horton argues that 
political legitimacy should be located in relation to the criteria that are oper-
ative in particular social, cultural and conceptual contexts, and which inform 
people’s judgements about the legitimacy of their state (145). In this way, 
Horton hopes to resist the attitude of several liberal (neo-Kantian) scholars 
who provide a predetermined justification of the principle of liberal legitima-
cy irrespective of both contextual circumstances and people’s actual beliefs. 
The notion of political legitimacy related to modus vivendi ought not to be 
extrapolated from consent theory: people consent to a modus vivendi because 
they acknowledge its political legitimacy (Horton 2019, 141-142). A modus 
vivendi is, for Horton, less stable than an ‘overlapping consensus’, yet such an 
instability reflects the very political circumstances from which it arises (Hor-
ton 2010, 441). Thus, he suggests a contingent and relatively unstable idea of 
political legitimacy linked to actual political institutions and practices, which 
is aimed at ruling out the liberal commitment to public justification. This 
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account, however, can provide only scant resources for a normative defence 
of modus vivendi political legitimacy. By separating the notion of legitimacy 
from the justificatory requirement, Horton concedes that modus vivendi po-
litical legitimacy may not be distinctively liberal. He locates his idea of modus 
vivendi outside the realm of liberalism. Thus, the contingent account of po-
litical legitimacy could easily be satisfied in hierarchically ordered societies – 
say, a society whose conception of political authority is defined strictly in re-
ligious terms. For normative political theorizing, however, what counts is to 
provide an argument to explain a widely shared intuition regarding the fact 
that a liberal political order, in which basic freedoms and rights are protected, 
is preferable to one in which the principle of freedom of conscience is at risk. 
One might argue that Rawls also recognizes the political legitimacy of 
some non-liberal hierarchical societies, which he calls decent hierarchical 
peoples (Rawls 1999, 62 ff).2 Of course, Rawls’ notion of ‘decent peoples’ has 
important implications for the idea of international toleration, because the 
kind of pluralism that characterizes international society will inevitably be re-
flected in a diversity of political forms, some of which may be non-liberal de-
mocracies but still satisfy the conditions that justify the recognition of them 
as “equal participating members in good standing of the Society of Peoples” 
(59). Yet, the account of ‘institutional decency’ represents a central normative 
constraint. Rawls does not provide a clear definition of decency, but suggests 
that it might be understood as a kind of weak reasonability (Rawls 67; Beitz 
2000, 686). Rawls’ notion of decency amplifies the anti-paternalism of the 
theory. In the international Society of Peoples, some non-liberal decent hier-
archical peoples are recognized as members of an enlarged justificatory con-
stituency, the original position of second level. This weak form of legitimacy 
is based on their capacity as peoples to select and support what Rawls con-
siders to be “certain familiar and traditional principles of justice among free 
and democratic peoples” (1999, 37). Yet, two elements distinguish Rawls’ 
international legitimacy from the kind of political legitimacy suggested by 
modus vivendi theorists. First, also this weak idea of international legitimacy 
is grounded on an ‘overlapping consensus’ among liberal and decent non-lib-
eral peoples; second, the liberal notion of legitimacy, which is satisfied within 
liberal societies, and the legitimacy of decent non-liberal peoples, which is 
2 I am grateful to John Horton for raising this point. 
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realized at the level of the Society of Peoples, importantly differ. I shall return 
to this point in Section 6.
However, some supporters of modus vivendi theorizing have taken the com-
mitment to liberalism seriously in providing an account of political legitimacy 
linked to some form of public justification. McCabe (2010) offers an inter-
esting case of a modus vivendi justificatory project. Here, a minimal account 
of political justice that is justified as a modus vivendi should be preferred to an 
idealized version of liberalism. MVL is nonetheless linked to a normative ac-
count of political legitimacy as far as it reflects citizens’ reasons to consent to it. 
Thus, MVL provides a more plausible answer to what McCabe calls the liberal 
project’s ‘Justificatory Requirement’. In his view, JR is essential to any liberal 
theory insofar as it captures two main features of liberalism, namely the harm 
principle and anti-perfectionism. The task of MVL is to reconnect JR to the 
deep pluralism emerging in contemporary societies. In this model, the political 
legitimacy of a specific institutional setting must reflect a commitment to JR 
that is compatible with a fundamental condition of inclusiveness. 
MVL is a ‘particularist’ form of liberalism rooted in two considerations: 
first, the recognition that many citizens might not endorse a liberal view of 
political association; and yet second, that these citizens might see the existence 
of the state either as an unchangeable fact of modern life or as something that 
is instrumental to the achievement of other important goods (McCabe 2010, 
133). Under these conditions, an agreement on the liberal terms might emerge 
as a compromise among citizens who view the liberal state as a second-best 
solution (133). As a normative project, MVL asks citizens who accept the lib-
eral terms on a modus vivendi basis to commit themselves to a weak procedur-
alism that is grounded in a presumption that the interests of all persons matter 
equally (140). Like other scholars who have emphasized the need to make the 
liberal justificatory constituency more inclusive (see especially Sala 2013; Kelly 
and McPherson 2001), McCabe believes that it is necessary to recast JR so as 
to include those citizens who, albeit illiberal, would nonetheless have reasons 
to accept the liberal state. Under a modus vivendi, liberal principles might be 
endorsed, for contingent reasons, also by those illiberal citizens who are exclud-
ed from Rawls’ justificatory constituency. Although this sort of compromise 
might lead to lesser degrees of stability, “it does not fail to meet the ideal of 
justification”, McCabe argues (2010, 156).
To test the implications of McCabe’s justificatory project and whether 
it appropriately addresses the problem at the core of the realist critique of 
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Rawls’ project, I shall explore Sangiovanni’s (2008) definition of a prac-
tice-dependent model of political theorizing in the next section and consid-
er Rawls’ and McCabe’s approaches in the light of it. I then go on to consider 
the implications that these two liberal justificatory projects have for the idea 
of legitimacy.
3. Two versions of practice-dependent liberalism
Sangiovanni has distinguished a ‘practice-dependent’ model of political the-
orizing – in which “the content, scope and justification of justice depends on 
the structure and form of the practices that the conception is intended to gov-
ern” – from a more general practice-independent view of morality which holds 
that first principles of justice do not depend on practices or institutions (2008, 
2). In general terms, practice-dependence is founded on a relational account 
of justice since it assumes that institutions and social practices “put people in 
a special relationship, and it is this special relationship that gives rise to first 
principles of justice” (4). Thus, a practice-dependent model of political justice 
relates a certain notion of equality to extant social institutions. In my view, 
both Rawls and McCabe could be seen to endorse a practice-dependent model 
of justice in which ‘politics is prior to morality’ (Sangiovanni 2008, 5). How-
ever, the ways in which the two normative approaches link their justificatory 
framework to principles and institutions varies significantly.
From Rawls’ PL, we derive an institutional interpretation of practice-de-
pendency. As I have shown elsewhere (Gentile 2017), Rawls’ political con-
structivism is a procedure that enables the specification of the normative im-
plications of certain moral premises concerning citizens’ social and political 
equality for the political conception of political authority. This procedure 
assumes institutional conceptions of citizenship and society and a back-
ground condition of reasonableness, so that ‘rational agents, as representative 
of citizens and subject to reasonable conditions, select the public principles 
of justice to regulate the basic structure of society’ (Rawls 1996, 93). This 
account serves to demonstrate the practical aim of Rawls’ conception of po-
litical authority – namely, justice as fairness: “it presents itself as a concep-
tion of justice that might be shared by citizens as a basis of reasoned, shared 
and informed and willing political agreement. It expresses their shared and 
public political reason” (9; on this point see also Klosko 1997). This view 
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of practice-dependence tells us that sharing a liberal institutional context (I) 
shapes the framework of reasons (Ri) for endorsing a conception of politi-
cal authority (P) that better represents certain moral premises concerning 
citizens understood as socially and politically equal (Mi). The institutional/
public morality (Mi) expressed by the appeal to the shared framework of 
reasons (Ri) reflects citizens’ consensus regarding the liberal terms. For Rawls, 
the appeal to shared reasons (Ri) is consistent with citizens’ capacity to realize 
political autonomy (Rawls 1996, 77-78). I will come back to this notion of 
political autonomy in the next section. 
McCabe seems to offer a different version of practice-dependence. The 
political legitimacy of JR based on a modus vivendi is to be drawn from ac-
tual citizens’ acceptance of the liberal terms which reflect society members’ 
actual equality of status, understood here as a ‘presupposition of minimal 
universalism’ (McCabe 2010, 140). This model seems to adhere to the prac-
tice-dependence desiderata since it assumes that institutions and practices 
put people in a special relationship and this gives rise to principles of political 
justice. In this case, however, the liberal order is justifiable by citizens who 
endorse a set of different reasons, e.g. instrumental, prudential, and so on (let 
us call them r1, r2, r3, …), all reflecting a contingent condition of actual social 
equality (C*) that is, in turn, implicit in that institutional setting (Ic). Mc-
Cabe distinguishes between JR understood as a moral ideal, namely Rawls’ 
Ri, from the set of reasonings r1, r2, r3, … that motivate the endorsement of 
a liberal institutional arrangement to which JR applies (159). Under a modus 
vivendi, citizens show their commitment to JR, albeit for different reasons, 
and this achieves morally acceptable outcomes. JR is therefore here under-
stood as a procedural commitment which ‘serves as a constraint on acceptable 
outcomes’ (160) without entailing any specific one. 
4. Political legitimacy, inclusivism and public justification 
In the previous section, I argued that McCabe’s project can be seen as an 
attempt to recast an idea of practice-dependency in terms of a weak form of 
proceduralism that is genuinely political. According to the author, this rules 
out problematic notions such as reasonableness and reasonable pluralism in 
favour of a contingent understanding of compromise among competing sets 
of reasons. Under such a contingency, however, the liberal state is just one 
Valentina Gentile
Modus vivendi liberalism, 
practice-dependance and political legitimacy
10
possible outcome of the justificatory scheme. McCabe concedes that the case 
for modus vivendi liberalism depends upon conditions that are neither uni-
versal nor guaranteed (2010, 160). 
Yet, what are the implications of this justificatory project for the notion of 
political legitimacy? While the institutional account importantly connects a 
notion of stability ‘for the right reasons’ to the principle of liberal legitimacy, 
MVL, understood as a practice-dependent model of political theorizing, en-
tails a trade-off between the stability of the consensus and the notion of po-
litical legitimacy. In rejecting the idea of a shared framework of reasons, MVL 
appeals to a notion of political legitimacy that is grounded in an account of 
inclusiveness. Let us call it the Inclusiveness Requirement (IR). Given the 
deep pluralism of contemporary societies, the political legitimacy of liberal 
institutions can only be contingent: it is realized when citizens’ reasons con-
verge in endorsing this institutional arrangement. 
For Rawls, the converse is true. Acknowledging the fact of reasonable 
pluralism is precisely why an idea of stability ‘for the right reasons’ should be 
supported. As Weithman (2011; 2016, 98 ff) has shown, the reason behind 
Rawls’ political turn was his recognition that the idea of stability presented 
in A Theory of Justice was unrealistic. That book laid out how a liberal insti-
tutional setting would encourage members’ views of the good to ‘converge’ 
– that there would be a ‘congruence’ between the right and the good. But 
Rawls came to realize that this conclusion was not only improbable but also 
conflicted with the fact that liberal institutions encourage pluralism about 
the good. Now, the principle of liberal legitimacy that is expressed in JR 
is a guarantee of this new idea of stability. The appeal to Ri, which reflects 
the values expressed by liberal institutions, is not aimed at preventing moral 
disagreement; rather, it encourages reasonable pluralism by showing some 
degree of ‘compatibility’ between a private and public morality. The idea of 
compatibility between the good and the right, however, suggests that state 
laws or decisions should not necessarily have to be regarded as ‘good’ from 
the perspective of one citizen’s comprehensive doctrine in order to be seen as 
legitimate. The legitimacy refers rather to the justificatory process that reflects 
such a compatibility. Quong’s (2005) distinction between foundational and 
justificatory disagreement might be useful here to grasp the sense in which 
liberal legitimacy is linked to Rawls’ JR. As Quong rightly points out, Rawls’ 
standard for liberal legitimacy asserts that the state should not act on grounds 
that citizens cannot “reasonably expect to endorse” (2005, 316). 
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Yet, McCabe believes that Rawls’ notion of liberal legitimacy is problem-
atic precisely because it assumes a background condition of reasonable plu-
ralism. In contrast, MVL suggests a justification for liberalism that cannot 
be rejected by those who are unreasonable. Some gradations of instability are 
the price to be paid to ensure such a broader justificatory constituency: the 
inclusiveness of reasons, in turn, seems here to be the crucial factor to realize 
political legitimacy. Thus, while Rawls’ principle of liberal legitimacy derives 
from a symmetry between the framework of reasons (Ri) for endorsing a par-
ticular liberal institutional setting and certain moral premises regarding the 
normative ideal of citizens understood as free and equal (Mi), MVL relies on 
an account of political legitimacy that is satisfied when different citizens, on 
grounds of their own different reasons (r1, r2, r3, …), actually and voluntarily 
support a contingent liberal arrangement (Ic). 
It is precisely this nexus of political legitimacy, IR and JR that I find 
problematic in MVL, however. Under a modus vivendi, it might be the case 
that citizens endorsing different reasons, both liberal and illiberal, come vol-
untarily to support the same liberal institutional arrangement. Yet, as Rawls 
maintains, when liberal institutions are accepted as a modus vivendi, they will 
be easily abandoned when the balance of forces among citizens’ competing 
views changes in favour of one specific doctrine. For McCabe, this possibility 
would not detract from what is appealing in MVL: that under a modus viven-
di the liberal state could be endorsed and justified by all citizens on the basis 
of their own reasons. Such a congruence between the conception of political 
justice (the right) and citizens’ varying comprehensive doctrine (the good) 
would be the guarantee for citizens’ autonomy. Yet, even conceding that such 
a consensus is both contingent and unstable, it is not clear how those who are 
not committed to liberalism, and especially citizens who endorse illiberal 
doctrines, would nevertheless freely and voluntarily support the liberal state. 
In responding to this objection, McCabe concedes that MVL needs to 
explain why liberal institutions are the best option not only for citizens who 
support liberalism, but also for those who see it as a second-best solution. He 
insists that citizens who endorse illiberal views will be still committed to an 
ideal of the equal moral status of all persons, so that liberal institutions are 
a suitable option not only for fully liberal citizens, but for all citizens who 
are committed to such a view of equality (2010, 159). This move is bizarre. 
Although McCabe asserts that the mere acceptance of the liberal terms might 
emerge as a compromise among competing forces, he also argues that under 
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a modus vivendi, citizens, either liberal or illiberal, endorse liberal institutions 
on the basis of their own reasons given their shared commitment to equality. 
A distinctive feature of MVL is therefore “its commitment to minimal moral 
universalism grounded in the presumption that the interests of all persons 
matter equally” (138). In other words, McCabe seems to share some of the 
Rawlsian concerns regarding the stability of liberal institutions precisely in 
connection with such a commitment to the IR.
If I understand McCabe’s argument correctly, however, it seems that from 
the theory we can derive two different interpretations of the notion of politi-
cal morality that, in turn, entail two different views of the political legitima-
cy-IR-JR nexus. At some point in his argument, McCabe seems to derive an 
equality of moral status from the contingent liberal institutions (2010, 133). 
Yet, it seems that this view of equality, which is consistent with a contingent 
practice-dependent justificatory model, reflects a de facto situation of equali-
ty that is the product of the historical development of modernity. This model, 
however, can provide only a weak normative defence of the liberal state. In 
other sections of McCabe’s book, though, a thicker moral understanding of 
equality seems to transcend such a contingent institutional situation: Mc-
Cabe relates “the presumption that the interests of all persons matter equally” 
to what he calls a “moral minimal universalism” (2010, 138). This notion 
of thin morality seems to trump practice-dependency: in this way, however, 
this proposal fails to meet the main realist desiderata of the theory, that is the 
“priority of politics to morality”. 
In the next two sections, I consider McCabe’s project in light of the two 
interpretations suggested above. In the first case, MVL is presented as a dis-
tinctive practice-dependent model of justification, one that entails an idea of 
a convergence of reasons that ought to be introduced with the aim of public 
justification. This view contrasts with Rawls’ consensus view, which bases 
public deliberation on shared and accessible reasons. For Rawls, the appeal 
to a shared framework of reasons is crucial to support the ideal of political 
autonomy, which is linked in turn to the principle of liberal legitimacy. In 
the contingent model, instead, the appeal to different reasons is committed to 
an idea of threshold autonomy (McCabe 2010, 51-53) linked to political le-
gitimacy. According to MVL, the liberal state is a legitimate one as long as all 
citizens, even illiberal ones, have reasons to accept and endorse that political 
order. Section 6 instead considers the case of MVL as a practice-independent 
model of public justification. 
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5. MVL as a practice-dependent justificatory model of political 
theorizing
How should the political legitimacy of liberal institutions be understood in 
the outlined practice-dependent interpretation of MVL? Crucial to prac-
tice-dependency is the priority of politics to morality. Rawls’ institutional ver-
sion of practice-dependency connects politics to morality in a specific way: 
it ensures that the conception of political authority, which is justifiable to all 
citizens, is committed to a view of institutional morality that sees citizens as 
free and equal. McCabe’s contingent version of practice-dependency seems to 
reproduce a similar structure insofar as it suggests that, by sharing the same 
institutional settings in which they are recognized as equals, all citizens might 
endorse a liberal state S for their own reasons that, albeit different in nature 
(e.g. instrumental, prudential, self-interested and so on), all reflect a widely 
shared intuition regarding equality (M) which is implicit in that contingent 
liberal institutional setting. Let us call this set of private reasons rm1, r
m
2, r
m
3, 
etc. In this sense, the argument supported by contingent and institutional 
practice-dependent scholars is similar. The difference is rather related to the 
content of political morality: a notion of equality of moral status which is 
reflected in a plurality of private reasons is here opposed to an institutional 
understanding of political morality in which citizens are understood as free 
and equal.
However, if this is the case for modus vivendi JR, this model seems to pro-
vide a version of the convergence view of the kind defended by Stout (2009) 
and Gaus and Vallier (2009). The difference between convergence and con-
sensus is specified by the variable R in JR. Following D’Agostino (1996), the 
distinction between consensus and convergence views can be described as 
follows: 
If both A and B share a reason R that make the regime reasonable for them, 
then the justification of the regime is grounded on the consensus with respect 
to R. If A has a reason Ra that makes that regime reasonable for him and B 
has a reason Rb that makes that regime reasonable for her, then the justifica-
tion of the regime is based on convergence on it from separate points of view 
(D’Agostino 1996, 30). 
Thus, the dispute here is about the framework of reasons that serves the 
justificatory desiderata. For Vallier, the acknowledgement of the fact of rea-
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sonable pluralism in the liberal JR should imply “that there is a presumption 
in favour of less restrictive conceptions of reasons” (2011, 4-5). Similarly, in 
McCabe’s view, a convergence of reasons reflects the possibility that illiberal 
citizens might nonetheless endorse liberal institutions as a second-best ar-
rangement on the basis of their own reasons. Differently from Gaus and Val-
lier, however, McCabe’s idea of convergence is committed to a realist form of 
political theorizing: he hopes to rule out thick moral notions such as reason-
ability and reasonable pluralism that he finds problematic in the institution-
al model. While the institutional version of practice-dependence envisages a 
consensus in the model of public justification where the reason R must be ei-
ther shared or at least accessible to all citizens – for it appeals to reasons we all 
expect to be endorsed (see on this also Boettcher 2015, 192) – the contingent 
version of practice-dependence suggests that a convergence of different sets 
of reasons would be sufficient to guarantee the realization of a weak version 
of autonomy, which McCabe calls threshold autonomy (2010, 51-3). In this 
way, McCabe hopes to show that as far as all citizens have reasons to endorse 
the liberal order, that order is legitimate to them. Thus, while the political 
legitimacy of liberal order is guaranteed by its commitment to the IR – based 
on the inclusion of citizens’ reasons – its political stability can only be weak. 
For McCabe, this is a necessary outcome if we take seriously the form of deep 
pluralism that characterizes contemporary democracies. Although MVL pro-
vides only a weak defence of the liberal order, this is one that could be accept-
ed also by critics of liberalism.
The contingent model presents a justificatory defence of liberal institutions 
that is committed to a weak version of autonomy. Here, political legitimacy 
is linked to the absence of coercion. In his treatment of JR, McCabe distin-
guishes between in-practice and in-theory justifiability. A’s claim is justifiable 
in practice to B if, by acknowledging the fact of pluralism, it is supported by 
a line of reasoning that is seen by B as “warranted by good reasons” (McCabe 
2010, 81). In contrast, A’s claim is justifiable in theory to B if “it is grounded 
on reasons that would persuade an appropriately competent interlocutor” 
(ibidem). McCabe argues that Rawls moves from the first, in-practice justi-
fiability, to the second, in-theory justifiability (82). By committing the prin-
ciple of liberal legitimacy to an idea of ‘stability for the right reasons’, Rawls’ 
justificatory model shifts foundational disagreements about justice to a dis-
pute concerning the framework of reasons that reasonable citizens should be 
expected to endorse. This move, McCabe believes, is unfeasible: it restricts 
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the justificatory constituency only to those (reasonable citizens) who already 
endorse the moral premises implicit in that justificatory construction. It is 
also normatively inadequate: it is morally arbitrary and disregards the form 
of pluralism that characterizes contemporary liberal societies. 
My impression, however, is that McCabe fails to acknowledge some im-
portant aspects of Rawls’ institutional model. In his recent work, Weithman 
has argued that an important difference between convergence and consensus 
is related to the way in which different notions of political autonomy are con-
nected to the idea of political legitimacy (2016, 168). Weithman’s reasoning 
is extremely useful in illuminating the real difference between the contin-
gent and institutional models. As noted above, both institutional views and 
contingent views are consistent with a practice-dependent model of political 
theorizing. In both cases, the form of justifiability is constrained by a certain 
notion of political morality. Both justificatory schemes are concerned with 
the realization of a certain notion of political autonomy distinct from a com-
prehensive view of autonomy. However, against Rawls’ institutional under-
standing of political morality, McCabe proposes a ‘weak’ idea of equality of 
moral status which is reflected in a plurality of private reasons. While Rawls’ 
idea of political autonomy is realized if a liberal state is justified in light of 
an institutional conception of political morality, in which citizens are under-
stood free and equal, McCabe believes that a kind of threshold autonomy is 
realized when citizens voluntarily accept the liberal order on the basis of their 
own reasons. 
This difference in the two theorists’ understanding of political autonomy 
has important implications for their accounts of legitimacy. For McCabe, the 
liberal order is legitimate when its justificatory structure expresses its unco-
ercive character: we should not expect all citizens to assign the same value 
to or justify in the same way, say, the constitutional principle of freedom of 
conscience; it is sufficient to acknowledge that, given certain historical and 
contingent conditions, all citizens are in-practice ready to accept it. For Raw-
ls, however, the uncoercive character of liberal institutions is not what counts 
in JR. The principle of liberal legitimacy asks that the justification for the 
coercion of liberal institutions should reflect an ideal of political autonomy in 
which citizens are understood as free and equal. Rawls in fact believes that it 
is not enough to acknowledge that certain historical or contingent conditions 
might bring about the same conclusions regarding the liberal regime S. The 
justifiability of S should rest on some moral premises that people share by 
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virtue of their status as citizens. Thus, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
the form of justifiability should be stable for the right reasons. The idea of 
stability ‘for the right reasons’, linked to the principle of liberal legitimacy, is 
not meant to rule out coercion; rather, it aims at providing a justification for 
coercion which reflects an institutional understanding of political morality 
while transcending the contingency of certain historical or particular facts 
of a given society (see on this also Weithman 2016). Therefore, citizens are 
expected to endorse the constitutional principle of freedom of conscience in 
terms that reflect not their comprehensive or contingent reasons, but their 
moral and political status as citizens. 
Imagine that A supports a certain illiberal view x – say, the caste system. 
Imagine that x is also shared by the majority of citizens of the state S where 
A lives. Now, suppose that in S there is only a small minority that does not 
support x, but that these citizens have prudential or self-interested reasons to 
support x as a second-best solution (they believe that if they support a differ-
ent view this would endanger their status, or they think that by supporting 
x they will be granted a special status within S). In this situation, the caste 
regime of S would be uncoercive to both the majority that fully supports x 
and the minority that supports x as a second-best solution. However, this 
regime cannot be said to be legitimate from a liberal point of view. For lib-
eral legitimacy, we need to justify why a specific form of coexistence, namely 
the liberal one, is something citizens should give value to, albeit disagreeing 
deeply in terms of their comprehensive views. 
6. MVL as a practice-independent model of political theorizing
McCabe would probably be resistant to this conclusion. He would perhaps 
argue that such a case could not arise under modern conditions, simply 
because too many citizens would resist it. As already mentioned, McCabe 
maintains that his particularistic defence of liberalism rests on the conjunc-
tion of two facts: contemporary societies are characterized by a form of plu-
ralism that is not necessarily reasonable, but these citizens do nonetheless 
regard liberal institutions either as an unchangeable fact of modern life or 
as something that is instrumental to the achievement of other ends (2010, 
133). Even conceding that this case is too unrealistic to be taken seriously, a 
conceptual problem with this idea of political legitimacy remains: if this is 
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the right interpretation of MVL as a justificatory project, this model of theo-
rizing hardly helps to provide an adequate justification for the liberal political 
order when a large majority of the population endorses an illiberal doctrine, 
such as the caste system. 
However, McCabe could also respond that my reading of MVL’s justifica-
tory project as a practice-dependent model is in fact incorrect. If MVL does 
not provide a practice-dependent view of justice, the opposite should be true. 
Following Sangiovanni, a practice-independent view of morality holds that 
first principles of justice do not depend on practices or institutions (2008: 2). 
Accordingly, the justification for a modus vivendi should not be derived from 
extant institutions, but rather should be committed to a transcendent view 
of morality. Thus, the set of reasons (r1, r2, r3 …) that citizens can endorse 
to justify the liberal state, albeit different in nature, must all reflect a view of 
morality that McCabe calls ‘minimal moral universalism’. Thus, MVL JR is 
committed to a view of moral universalism that is implicit in the internation-
al human rights standards (McCabe 2010, 138). 
The caste-system-supporting state S would of course be ruled out as a 
possibility by this account of MVL JR. But not on the grounds of political 
legitimacy: this sort of regime would be impossible because the illiberal view 
x on which it stands is in opposition to such a ‘minimal moral universalism’. 
According to this interpretation, however, it seems that a kind of constraint 
on the permissible set of reasons is necessary to realize the idea of threshold 
autonomy defended by McCabe. Thus, much of what was appealing in the 
MVL project seems to be lost in the practice-independent interpretation. 
By selectively intervening in the sets of citizens’ private reasons, this view is 
inconsistent with its anti-perfectionist premises. 
Thus, this second interpretation of the modus vivendi justificatory project 
is also unsatisfactory. By relying on a view of morality which is context-in-
dependent, the justificatory structure of MVL is at odds with the main goal 
of the theory, which is to provide a less idealized and somehow anti-utopian 
defence of the liberal state. It is neither anti-utopian, since it relies on an ex-
ternal view of morality that applies to JR, nor is it able to provide a defence 
of the liberal state that is strong, only one that is contingent and very limited.
McCabe might still object that MVL is not anti-utopian or committed to 
a radical realist rejection of moral or ideal theorizing, but should rather be 
understood as a model of ideal theorizing aimed at ensuring more inclusivity 
than Rawls’ public reason liberalism. Yet, I wonder whether the appeal to a 
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moral minimum is enough to defend the liberal order. MVL ideal theorizing 
seems to provide a version of toleration similar to Rawls’ international model. 
As mentioned above, Rawls’ institutional decency is the requirement for the 
inclusion of some non-liberal societies in the Society of Peoples. A decent 
hierarchical society is presented as peaceful, respectful of basic human rights 
and supportive of some form of equality. Yet, the form of political auton-
omy required by the liberal principle of legitimacy is realized only within 
well-functioning liberal democratic regimes. It seems that MVL JR crucially 
disregards the discontinuities between these two accounts of legitimacy.
To understand this last point, it might be useful to consider the case of 
an existing state. Take for example the case of Venezuela, a constitutional 
republic committed to basic human rights and a certain degree of political 
pluralism.3 Yet, this regime is founded on an illiberal doctrine of popular 
sovereignty over national resources that entails the weakening of property 
rights.4 The restrictions on firms’ and individuals’ property rights is perhaps 
the most problematic aspect of chavismo from a liberal democratic perspec-
tive. Nonetheless, Venezuela’s political regime – at least under Chávez – could 
fall within the category of a decent society and liberal peoples ought to toler-
ate it in the Society of Peoples (see on this point also Gentile 2018). 
Concluding remarks
Contemporary normative theory is marked by a realist turn. In this paper 
I have linked a main realist concern, where the political is defined as being 
distinct from morality, to Sangiovanni’s idea of a practice-dependence model 
of political theorizing. I have suggested that McCabe’s defence of the liberal 
3 In the elections of 2013, President Maduro defeated his more moderate opponent, 
Capriles, by a slim margin (only 1.5 per cent), a result that was deeply contested by the 
opposition and which has put into question the legitimacy of the whole process (see 
McCarthy and McCoy 2013). This stands in contrast with a pattern that, from 2006 
to 2012, saw President Chávez build a system of cooperative relationships with his mo-
derate opponents and demonstrate openness to political pluralism. This strengthened 
Chávez’s political legitimacy and popular support. 
4 Chavismo is based on the idea that national resources belong to the population and 
the government has the right to revoke the ownership of private firms or individuals in 
the name of the Venezuelan people.
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order on the grounds of a modus vivendi could be understood as a contingent 
model of practice-dependent political theorizing. This has been contrasted 
with Rawls’ institutional model. The contingent practice-dependent version 
of JR suggests a weaker form of proceduralism that is genuinely political. This 
view is meant to rule out problematic notions such as reasonableness and 
reasonable pluralism in favour of a contingent understanding of compromise 
among competing sets of reasons.
A contingent justification of the liberal order is, however, a weak one. 
For McCabe, a loss in terms of stability is the price to be paid if we want 
to take seriously the fact of moral diversity that characterizes contemporary 
societies. MVL is meant to provide a justification of liberal institutions that 
the critics of liberalism cannot reject. Such an attempt to expand the justifi-
catory constituency of JR is reflected in the account of political legitimacy, 
realized when citizens voluntarily accept the liberal arrangements. The idea 
of in-practice justifiability is therefore preferred to Rawls’ in-theory model. 
McCabe’s model seems to miss a crucial point of Rawls’ institutional prac-
tice-dependence and the idea of liberal legitimacy related to it. As I have 
shown in this paper, the most problematic aspect of the contingent model is 
that it disconnects the idea of legitimacy from a conception of liberal political 
morality: an idea of political legitimacy that reflects the uncoercive character 
of extant institutions seems to be sufficient to meet the MVL JR. Yet, from 
a normative point of view, this might be not enough. As the example of the 
caste system shows, and McCabe would perhaps agree, normative political 
theory need not show that the system is in-practice uncoercive; rather it needs 
to provide an argument that explains why a specific form of coexistence, 
namely the liberal one, is something citizens should give value to, albeit dis-
agreeing deeply in terms of their comprehensive views. 
In conclusion, I have considered McCabe’s model as a version of ‘prac-
tice-independent’ moral theorizing. A transcendent view of threshold mo-
rality is meant to ensure certain acceptable outcomes in terms of rights and 
freedoms. This move, however, comes at the cost of sacrificing the theory’s 
premises of anti-perfectionism and realism. Furthermore, the appeal to a 
threshold morality, implicit in the international human rights standards, 
seems to be inadequate to distinguish between the legitimacy of a liberal 
order, in which all democratic freedoms are secured, and that of a decent, yet 
not fully liberal, institutional order.
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